Subpoesia/Subpoetry
by Jose Luis Mendonca1
“Sub-Saharan are we
Subtended subjects
Subspecies of the subworld
Subnourished are we
Surges of subepidemics
Summarily subdead
Of subdollars are we
Subdeveloped subjects
Of a subservient south
The Angolan Civil War lasted from 1961 to 2005 and involved a multitude of intersecting interests. Considered by historical consensus a ‘hot’ battle of the Cold War, it is one of many battles seen through the lens of the East-West framework. Historians define framework as a set of ideas or theories which provide a conceptual basis in order to help structure and form arguments and narratives. Conceptually, the East-West theoretical framework promotes a tendency of focusing on either the United States or the Soviet Union. One can find a new conceptual innovation in the pericentrist framework put forth by Tony Smith in “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War.” This framework reorients the focus of Cold War studies towards the periphery giving a multifaceted view of events. With this new perspective, we understand more clearly the interests of what Smith calls junior members of the Cold War.2 Elaborating on the complexity of the system of Cold War politics, researcher William Minter identified relationships between senior and junior players within Cold War conflicts as proxy, client-patron, or ally.3 This pericentrist framework explains the motivation for regional actors such as South Africa, Zaire, Zambia and Cuba. Even further, it helps to explain the internal interests of the on-the-ground agents of the Angolan Civil War, MPLA (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola), and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). This framework gives agency back to the so-called proxies of the Cold War conflicts. In the following pages, I will argue that junior players such as Cuba, South Africa, Zaire, Zambia, MPLA, and UNITA all blocked, moderated, expanded, and intensified the Angolan Civil war in order to pursue their own interests.
Through the years, the Cold War has been view through four differing frameworks. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the first framework, now called traditionalism, explained events in terms of Communist encroachment and Soviet expansionism. Revisionism, the second framework developed during the late 1960s into the 1970s, explained events in terms of the United States’ imperialistic ventures into third world countries. Later historians established the post-revisionism framework in the late 1970s and 1980s. This third framework portrayed events in terms of the US-USSR rivalry which followed the power vacuums formed after World War II. Finally, pericentrism, put forth by Tony Smith, explains that studying the Cold War only in terms of the core nations’ perspectives gives an incomplete view of events. According to this latest framework, historians should re-examine the Cold War with regard to the peripheries’ perspective. This framework becomes extremely helpful in understanding junior actors in the Cold War and their contributions to history. It essentially returns agency to the third world participants of the Cold War conflicts.4
In analyzing secondary source material, terminology remains imperative. In describing South African covert action in Angola, historians have used the term invasion (siding with MPLA), or operation (siding with UNITA). When describing the conflict in Angola, historians such as W. Martin James III have said civil war (ignoring the conflict’s beginning in the colonial stage) in opposition to internal conflict (de-emphasizing the international element in the war), or low-intensity conflict (using United States Cold War phrasing). Historians have described UNITA soldiers as insurgents (implying MPLA as solely legitimate), reactionaries (implying UNITA as an anti-Communist proxy), or revolutionaries (emphasizing the UNITA’s legitimate criticism toward MPLA. Instead, in order to maintain objectivity and equality, I will try to provide neutral terminology in all descriptions of actors and actions within this conflict: simply soldiers rather than insurgents, conflict rather than civil war or proxy war, and raid or incursion rather than invasion.
One can divide the conflict in Angola into four stages: Colonial (1961-1975), Independence (1975-1976), Civil War (1981-1994), and Insurrection (1998-2005). During the Colonial stage, three movements emerged in the fight against the Portuguese empire: MPLA, FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), and finally UNITA. The Soviet Union funded MPLA while Zaire and the People’s Republic of China funded FNLA. The Organization for African Unity and several other Pan-African nations and groups supported all three movements and tried to establish a united front against Portugal. During the formative years of the 1960s, hostilities between the three movements erupted ruining any chance of a united front, and created the historical distrust which plagued the peace process decades later. Though many considered FNLA the most militarily strong of the three movements, the Portuguese colonial government adequately suppressed all three groups until 1974 when a military coup led by young anti-fascist soldiers put a quick end to the long lasting Portuguese empire.
The second stage began with a race for the capital, Luanda, by all three groups. Despite FNLA’s military strength, MPLA (with Soviet training and aid) took the capital and the coastal cities, and declared the establishment of the People’s Republic of Angola. Because of its takeover of the colonial bureaucratic structure in Luanda, the MPLA earned legitimacy in the eyes of many urban residents of Angola. The bureaucratic structure was easy to adapt to the primarily Portuguese speaking assimiliado and white elite who ruled the MPLA. FNLA and UNITA quickly merged to form the Democratic People’s Republic of Angola and quicker still dissolved from infighting between the two groups and the personality clash between Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA and Daniel Chipenda, the FNLA strongman.5 Without cooperation, a Communist takeover of Angola by MPLA seemed imminent.
Perceiving that a hostile Angola threatened its hegemony in the region, the minority government of South Africa sent a covert force to act within Angola. By bolstering UNITA forces, Pretoria aimed to upset the MPLA victory and then retreat to Namibia without international attention. Faced with a technologically and financially superior foe in the South African army, MPLA defeat seemed assured until Cuban troops arrived at the MPLA controlled ports. The Cuban troops quickly boosted the MPLA military which helped to stop and turn back the South African advance. No longer covert, the United Nations renounced South Africa for its intrusion and forced a retreat back to Namibia.
Despite this setback, UNITA became strong enough to maintain control over the rural south of Angola. FNLA dissolved as MPLA and Zaire reached a separate peace. UNITA absorbed a great portion of FNLA’s soldiers as well as a substantial amount of its Western foreign aid.6 Fighting dissipated greatly after 1976 until 1980. During this time, AgostinhoNeto, the first president of Angola and the leader of the MPLA, purged his party after an attempted coup in 1977 led by conspirators who desired a more Soviet-oriented policy. In the meantime, Savimbi worked to garner Western support and recognition for his political party as a legitimate movement.7
Violence escalated during the 1980s as the Cold War dragged on, and the third stage of the conflict began. Cuban troops retained a large force to supplement defense against South African intrusions which occurred intermittently throughout the 1980s in various covert operations.8 UNITA received US aid under the Reagan administration, and expanded its conventional forces to operate throughout Angola.9 The MPLA extracted oil revenue from its refinery in Cabinda as well as received generous Soviet aid. Escalation wound down simultaneously with the end of the Cold War in 1991. South Africa finally withdrew from both Angola and Namibia in 1989 while Cuba withdrew in 1991. Following USSR dissolution, MPLA lost its foreign patron while the US and South Africa terminated their aid to UNITA. The United Nations brought the two groups together in consolidation and this so-called proxy war of the Cold War finally ended as the major players withdrew. Peace was attained at last.
Except this did not happen. Peace negotiations broke down and both sides continued to fight. Following Soviet withdrawal of support, the MPLA began to use money from oil to fund its military operations (which used suppression methods adopted from the former Portuguese colonial government) while UNITA started to mine and sell diamonds on the black market to support its operations. Eventually in late 1992, peace negotiations led to elections, yet distrust ran deep. Both sides claimed election fraud which resulted in a purge of UNITA supporters in Luanda known as the Halloween Massacre where 20,000 suspected-UNITA supporters were killed. UNITA began guerrilla operations once more and gained ground in its 1993-1994 operations.
The United Nations, frustrated by its inability to find reconciliation, blamed UNITA for continuing the war and, in 1992, pressed sanctions against its diamond revenues, essentially its only source of income. UNITA also further lost legitimacy in the international community as nations closed their embassies to them and refused to support them. This began the last stage of the conflict: Insurrection. UNITA persisted in guerrilla tactics which MPLA could not suppress. When MPLA attempted to reconcile once more by requiring UNITA to recognize MPLA legitimacy and re-enter the fold of the People’s Republic of Angola, disarmed, with an exiled Savimbi. Due to generational distrust and genuine disagreement, UNITA refused and continued guerrilla actions until Savimbi and several other UNITA leaders were assassinated in 2002. Even then insurrection continued from the Cabinda province with the persistent FLEC (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda) separatist movement which MPLA finally suppressed in 2005.
To fully understand this conflict, one has to acknowledge the complexity of the relationships which existed between senior and junior actors in this conflict. African researcher, William Minter, defines relations within Cold War conflicts as one of proxy, patronage, or alliance.10 Each of these relationships express differing levels of agency and cooperation between two or more actors. Proxy completely removes agency as junior actors effectively represent the interests of the senior actor. Patronage assigns both actors a great deal of agency while maintaining a suzerainty relationship of senior-junior between the two. Alliance describes a relationship of equals where two actors cooperate towards a mutual goal. One must also understand the flexible nature of these relationships. Patrons can still risk the displeasure of their supporting senior actors by pursuing their own goals. These relationships can also change depending upon the circumstances of the conflict. For example, UNITA received patronage from China during Independence, and then shifted to South Africa after losing China’s support.
An essentialist problem concerning the conflict in Angola exists as well. Many scholars have framed the conflict as they have historically framed African conflicts: as continuations of tribal warfare. If an Angolan belonged to a certain tribe then it is assumed that the individual would belong to a certain party. This does not account for the personal agency of the Angolan people. While in the Colonial stage of the conflict, each political party tended to receive most of its adherents from one of three primary ethnic groups, Minter, based on interviews from his travels in Angola, shows this to be a simplistic conception of the conflict:
One of the Angolan refugees I interviewed on the Namibian border in 1991 was a Methodist who grew up near Luanda speaking Kimbundu. With this background he would most likely support the MPLA. Another was Umbundu-speaking, and therefore presumably sympathetic to UNITA. In fact both were loyal to the FNLA…The stereotypes were not wrong, but they were half-truths. One of the refugees chose the FNLA in 1975 because he considered the group realistic in advocating a continuation of the capitalist system followed by the Portuguese. The other, a supporter of MPLA guerrilla leader Daniel Chipenda, followed him into the FNLA when Chipenda split with Agostinho Neto in 1974…The conversations were apt reminders that linkages between ethnic identities and political loyalties are far from simple. Stereotypes both reflect social reality and help mould it, as individuals are pressured to conform. But a host of other factors, including personal choice and circumstance, also affect the political line-up.11
The shallow essentialist problem reduces possible agency of Angolans within this conflict and reconceptualizes an age-old European dismissal view of African political astuteness. Minter’s in-depth study clearly identifies political and personal motivations behind each parties’ and party members’ desire for victory.
The conflict is best understood in terms of legitimacy. Both MPLA and UNITA performed as political parties-as-states which historian J. Pearce persuasively describes in his article, “Control, Politics and Identity in the Angolan Civil War.”12 Importantly, UNITA only began to truly decline once it lost its legitimacy with the international community and degraded into financial ruin inherent to such isolation. Furthermore, UNITA suffered new sanctions against its only source of revenue, diamonds, and the freezing of bank accounts belonging to members abroad.13 Before this, its constituency clearly saw UNITA as legitimate political party which won a clear majority in the Central Highlands during the 1993-1994 elections.14
MPLA forcibly transferred the rural population of Angola to its cities. This displacement had a great impact on legitimacy. Due to MPLA’s military policy, 50% of Angola’s population lived in cities by 1990 from 15% of the population in 1970.15 This created a disproportionate distribution of people who lived under MPLA rule, and would most likely support MPLA during the elections. Legitimacy also costs money. This shows a tendency for the party with the most money to attain legitimacy through its social services. In Angola, MPLA paid for these social services with oil revenue while UNITA paid with diamond revenue until the international community placed sanctions on its traffic.16 As UNITA could no longer provide these services, its supporters began to see it as less and less state-like.17 Legitimacy essentially influences our understanding of UNITA’s position toward the Lusaka Protocol. UNITA wanted to be treated on equal grounds with MPLA. Notably, UNITA wanted the United Nations to quarter both armies during the peace process.18 Otherwise, the historians would assume (as they did) that UNITA was an insurgent proxy. Due to this resistance, the United Nations condemned UNITA in 1993. This became evident when US envoy Paul Hare wrote, “The government wanted to demonstrate its dominance (and legitimacy), while UNITA wished to retain its separate power base and identity.”19 Some historians explain that UNITA lost its legitimacy within Angola because of its atrocities and corruption, but it is now generally acknowledged that both parties were corrupt and committed atrocities. For example, the United Nations condemned the MPLA’s seizure of Huambo during the peace process.20 Both MPLA and UNITA provided healthcare, education, and bureaucratic salaries until 1990 when UNITA poured funds into the military to ensure its survival.21 Both parties were perceived by the people of Angola as legitimate movements working towards differing goals and, thus, not mere proxies of foreign power.
Pericentrism argues for the pull of the junior actors being just as important as the push of the senior actors. Neto, for example, requested of Cuba to maintain a troop presence in Angola while Savimbi also actively requested assistance from both the United States and South Africa. Convincingly argued by Glejieses, Cuba helped to pull a begrudging USSR fully into the conflict while South Africa was unable to push the United States support into the conflict until Reagan took office. 22 Yet, the view of Cuba and South Africa as proxies of the superpowers persists to this day. As late as 2013, military historian Rodney Warwick assumed that South Africa and Cuba were acting as proxies for the United States and the Soviet Union.23
Were the two parties within Angola proxies, clients, or allies? Some historians such as William Minter quote Savimbi himself when he recited an Angolan proverb about “a drowning man falling in a river and being willing to deal with the devil himself if offered a stick to get out.”24 This view attributes a deal of agency to UNITA portraying it as a reluctant client of South Africa pursuing its own goals despite this relationship. The MPLA also existed as a client of Soviet support while maintaining its own integrity as it continued to have large economic ties with the West through its oil refinery in Cabinda, and refused to give the Soviet Union any naval bases on its coasts.
The conflict in Angola was a morass involving a multiplicity of actors. Each of the players worked toward their own interests at times allying with other players whose ultimate goal greatly differed from their own. Historians have tended to align under one of the players and greatly criticize the others nations. Historian Gleijieses, for example, believed the Cuban purpose in Angola was purely humanitarian while South Africa invaded as an imperialistic venture. Other historians such as W. Martin James III greatly admired Savimbi and believed him to be a genuine nationalist fighting against Soviet imperialist.
Both global agents (the United States and Soviet Union) vied for clientele within Angola. The Soviet Union supported the MPLA financially and provided weapons and training to its army.25 Still in 1977, Havana and Moscow split over the Angola issue.26 Moscow wanted to negotiate with UNITA while Havana wanted to defeat UNITA. The United States feared a Communist sympathetic Angola, because Gulf Oil (an American oil company) maintained interests in the Cabinda oil refinery and feared a Communist takeover. Furthermore, the loss of Angola would change the geopolitical situation for US ally Congo and South Africa. Though sympathetic to the ANC (African National Congress) plight, the United States sided with the South African government because, as historian Robert Harvey stated, a “Communist-dominated South Africa (was seen) as more alarming than a white-dominated South Africa was morally reprehensible.”27 Gleijieses echoes this, but also declares that the United States needed an easy victory to recover from Watergate and the Vietnam syndrome.
Southern African regional interests also affected the conflict in Angola. South Africa feared losing its hegemony in the region. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was created out of Black Southern Africa’s opposition to minority-ruled South African dominance. South Africa economically controlled other states through investments and labor imports. Angola survived as an exception having little South African influence, but could destabilize this system due to its support for SWAPO (South West African People’s Organiziation) and its entrance into the SADCC. Losing in Angola could result in the fall of Namibia to Black rule, and ultimately destroying the South African policy of détente and hegemonic rule. South Africa required hegemony in order to replace the former buffer of white-ruled states to protect its own minority interests.28
Pretoria’s regional policy was known as détente. Détente describes South Africa’s economic predominance to forge patron-client relationships with moderate black African states.29 By the time of the Angolan Civil War in the middle of 1975, détente had become the undisputed centerpiece of South Africa’s foreign policy. There are three ways that African nations have reacted to South Africa’s policy of détente. Zambia supported the struggle for national liberation aggressively and openly as MPLA. Lesotho and Malawi refused to support national liberation groups such as the ANC to garner South African favor and the venture capital that came with it. Botswana and Swaziland took the middle course of limited support for national liberation and opposition to apartheid while maintaining open economic relations with the South African government.30
Why would Cuba, a Caribbean island, enter the African continent with 425,000 soldiers over 16 years to fight against South African troops? Fidel Castro wanted to move Cuba closer to the Nonaligned Movement, a third block outside of Moscow’s and Washington’s control. In a September 1975 speech, Castro made this connection explicit, “The MPLA is part of the Nonaligned Movement and has had strong international support.”31 Castro dismissed any sentiment which suggested Cuba entered Angola on Soviet orders. He stated, “Ford and Kissinger lie to the people of the United States and to world public opinion when they try to place the responsibility for Cuba’s action in solidarity with Angola on the Soviet Union.”32 Regardless of altruistic motives, Africa existed as the only source of the third world where Cuba could enact its own hegemony as the Soviet Union dominated Eastern Europe, Mao’s China controlled Asia, and the United States influenced Latin America.33 Minter echoed this rational when he wrote, “Castro had a political and economic interest in MPLA-PT reliance on Cuban troops…Economically, the Cuban economy received a monthly infusion of money from Angola as payment for the Cuban troops.”34
Other African nations also had a stake in the conflict. Zaire under President Mobutu had an interest in Angola through familial ties to FNLA leader’s Holden Roberto (Mobuto was Roberto’s brother-in-law). Many observers perceived the FLNA as a Kongo nationalist group trying to re-establish the old Kongo kingdom with Zaire. An FLNA victory would extend Zairian influence and possibly even incorporate parts of Angola into Zaire specifically oil-rich Cabinda. Mobuto, funded by the CIA, but who also received Chinese support, was seen as a member of the Third World who could successfully play the West and East off against each other.35 Zaire wanted to establish hegemonic rule over Central Africa in contrast to South Africa’s role in Southern Africa. Zambia under President Kaunda also maintained an interest. Zambia desired a UNITA victory to reopen the Benguela railway for trade.36 Zambia lacked a coast and needed ports to export its copper, the main staple of its revenue, and, thus, Kaunda asked South Africa to intervene in the conflict setting up the meeting between Savimbi and South African leaders.37
While the Cold War existed as a backdrop, and regional interests intersected within Angola, one must not underestimate the desires and goals of the Angolan parties during the conflict (1961-2005). Marxist in orientation, but pragmatic considering it did not completely nationalize the Cabinda oil refinery, MPLA sought out Cuban and Soviet help rather than being propped up from outside support. The Soviets disliked Neto, the leader of the party and thought him too independent-minded. This dissatisfaction prompted the Soviets to support a coup attempt against Neto which caused him to purge the party of disloyalists. Neto sought out help from Cuba, and personally requested that Cuba maintain a presence within his country as long as the South African threat remained.
The MPLA won legitimacy due to its urban and modern character allowing it to win the support of the Angolans employed in the colonial administration. This allowed for a smooth transfer of the bureaucracy to MPLA hands from the Portuguese authorities.38 Regarding MPLA’s Communist affiliation, the party only became Marxist-Leninist in the 1970’s to garner popular support distinct from its cultural and elitist beginnings39 MPLA also further gained international recognition in the form of its films which served as ambassadors to the international community in which they cast themselves as a liberation movement rather than a Communist party.40
Several points must be made about UNITA. First, UNITA initially sought out Marxist support for it movement with Savimbi meeting with Castro and Mao as well as Soviet leaders. An interesting point to be made concerning UNITA being a proxy of South Africa would be the fact that UNITA previously trained and housed SWAPO guerrillas before their relationship with South Africa. Secondly, UNITA antagonized South Africa before their patronage. At the Calueque Dam and Ruacana hydroelectric installations: “workers at the border sites complained of repeated harassment by UNITA forces” before this relationship was established. Thirdly, one should look at UNITA’s own agenda as seen in its constitution. Important to note, UNITA and its supporters saw the movement as a non-aligned, Africanist political choice in contrast to the Europeanized Communist MPLA. UNITA was not simply a proxy of South Africa, but was actively working for its own agenda.41
Many historians have criticized UNITA as illegitimate and have shown its treatment of Angolan citizens to support this. Yet the fact remains that both parties were subject to corruption and oppressive measures. Many different sources can attest to this. Jemara Rone from Africa Watch stated that, “Both forces are attacking civilians.”42 A South African officer commented, “Huge stocks of food and charity gifts from Oxfam as well as a variety of Scandinavian governments were found in storehouses in the Quartel. Intended for the civilian population, everything had been appropriated by the military.”43 In 1978, President Neto silenced Radio Ecclesia, a radio program sponsored by the Catholic Church to suppress opposition and maintain a monopoly on information.44 The MPLA further targeted civilians in Luanda of different ethnicity as suspected UNITA or FNLA sympathizers.45 This political disruptive nature is further seen in the popular saying in Angola, “MPLA thieves, UNITA murders.”46 Neither side should be lionized nor be praised.
Why was it so hard for the three political movements to work together? The collusion between UNITA and the Portuguese government during the colonial struggle tainted the any source of legitimacy UNITA may have had with MPLA supporters.47 On the other hand the politics espoused by MPLA made them too undesirable to Angolans who wished to retain certain aspects of capitalism in their country. In UNITA’s constitution this is expressly guaranteed: “UNITA guarantees foreign investments and private enterprise without prejudice.”48 Furthermore, the constitution of the MPLA did not allow for any freedom of election. Article 2 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Angola stated, “all sovereignty rests with the Angolan people, but the MPLA…is in charge of the political, economic, and social leadership of the nation.” UNITA countered this in their own constitution which stated, “UNITA tirelessly fights for the holding of free elections in order to implement in Angola, a representative government, capable of planning, identifying and defining the needs, exercise authority, assign responsibilities and demand sacrifices.”49 Ultimately, though, it came down to power politics. The three leaders of each movement could not imagine a powersharing agreement with their political rivals.
Prolonged by Cold War power politics, the Angolan conflict devastated the economy of Angola which still relies greatly on oil revenue. While the Cold War influenced the conflict itself, it was more than just a proxy battle. The conflict began before the entrance of Cold War agents and ended after the exit of Cold War agents. It is true, though, that the entrance and exit of the senior agents significantly shaped the scale of the conflict. Yet, it is important to note that each junior agent actively vied for patronage of the senior actors. Angolans, Cubans, South Africans, and Zairians fought and battled toward their own interests. Rather than using frameworks as a two dimensional blueprint imposed over a narrative, historians should use multi-layered models to better situate frameworks over a narrative. The conflict in Angola existed as a three-tiered system of intersecting relationships and interests: global, regional, and local.
| OPERATION | DATE | COMMENTS |
| REINDEER | MAY 1978 | RAID ON KASSINGA |
| SAFRON | MARCH 1979 | RAID ON SWAPO NEAR ZAMBIAN BORDER |
| CROSSBAR | MARCH 1979 | RAID ON SWAPO BASE IN SE ANGOLA |
| SCEPTIC | JUNE 1980 | RAID LASTING 3 WEEKS |
| SMOKESHELL | JUNE 1980 | OFF-SHOOT OF SCEPTIC |
| KLIPKLOP | JULY 1980 | DESTROYED SWAPO BASE |
| PROTEA | AUGUST 1981 | MPLA UNITS ENGAGED FOR 1ST TIME |
| CARNATION | AUGUST 1981 | OFF-SHOOT OF PROTEA |
| DAISY | OCT/NOV 1981 | 1ST AIR CLASH BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND MPLA |
| SUPER | MARCH 1982 | RAID ON CAMENO IN SW ANGOLA |
| MEEBOS | JULY/AUG 1982 | RAID ON PLAN EASTERN FRONT HQ |
| PHOENIX | APRIL 1983 | RAID ON SWAPO BASE |
| ASKARI | DECEMBER 1983 | 1ST TIME DIRECTLY FIGHTING CUBANS |
| BUSH WILLOW | JUNE 1985 | RAID ON SWAPO POSITIONS |
| MODULAR | DECEMBER 1987 | INCURSION TO ASSIST UNITA |
| HOOPER | DECEMBER 1987 | INCURSION TO MAXIMIZE RETREATING MPLA FORCES |
| PACKER | JUNE 1988 | FORCE MPLA/CUBAN FORCES TO RETREAT WEST OF CUITO RIVER |
| DISPLACE | JUNE 1988 | OFF-SHOOT OF PACKER |
TABLE 1 (in ,000 tons)51
| RAILWAY | 1973 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 |
| BENGUELA | 2,567 | 401 | 259 | 186 | 202 |
| MOCAMEDES | 6,409 | 265 | 251 | 143 | 171 |
| LUANDA-MALANGE | 301 | 118 | 102 | 71 | 84 |
TABLE 2 (in dollars)52
| DATE | SOVIET MONETARY ASSISTANCE |
| 1976 | 450 MILLION |
| 1981 | 250 MILLION |
| 1982 | 300 MILLION |
| 1983 | 800 MILLION |
| 1985 | 2 BILLION |
| 1986 | 1 BILLION |
| 1987 | 1 BILLION |
| 1988 | 1.5 BILLION |
| 1989 | 800 MILLION |
Excerpts from the UNITA Constitution:
“Our programme can be summarized in four words which are at the same time the motto of our Movement: SOCIALISM, NEGRITUDE, DEMOCRACY, and NON-ALIGNMENT. NEGRITUDE—The African cultural identity of the Angolan population plays a key role in our concept of national unity. To the geographical limits and the colonial experience which characterize our country…It is not a question of arbitrary preservation of African cultural values, but what is necessary is that our culture must shine in a symbiosis with the other cultural influences, which have marked the Angolan civilization (Portuguese, Christian)…A people who feel culturally subjugated, such as the Angolan, can plainly never benefit from the privileges conferred upon them by their political independence, so long as they are subjected to continued foreign domination. Consequently, without identity, cultural pride, and proper civilization, such as a nation runs the risk of disappearing as a result of agglutination with other civilizations.” 53
Negritude: “Black Africa has its own culture which has been subverted by various colonial powers, resulting in ‘rootless African societies without a past’. Yet Africans do have deep roots in Africa which must form the basis of their culture without being exclusive. Inter-statal relations in Africa must be based on practical co-operation between free countries, and not on the unrealistic ideals advocated in the concept of ‘Pan-Africanism’. The basis of any successful form of African government is the recognition of the existence and importance of ethnic (tribal) groupings and systems.” 54
Annotated Bibliography
Bowman, Larry W. “The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa.” International Studies Quarterly 12, no. 3 (1968): 231-261.
This article explores South African hegemony in Southern Africa via the economic dependence of its surrounding states. It shows South Africa’s regional interests in Angola.
Castro, Fidel, Raul Castro, Nelson Mandela, and others. Cuba and Angola: Fighting for Africa’s Freedom and Our Own. New York: Pathfinder, 2013.
This book is a collection of Castro’s speeches concerning Cuba’s relationship with Angola. I use it to show Cuba’s interests in the conflict in Angola.
Cefkin, J. Leo. “African Development Strategies and the White Ruled States of Southern Africa.” Africa Today 20, no. 4 (1973): 29-37.
This article examines Black Africa’s possible disengagement strategies from South Africa. (Many of the possible options occurred following its publication).
Gleijeses, Piero. “Cuba and the Independence of Namibia.” Cold War History 7, no. 2 (2007): 285-303.
This article argues for the significance of Cuban involvement in Angola toward the independence of Namibia.
Gleijeses, Piero. Conflicting Missions : Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.
This book examines U. S. and Cuban involvement in various independence movements and colonial struggles. The section on Cuba’s involvement is thoroughly researched as he was able to examine never before seen Cuban archives.
Good, Kenneth. “Zambia and the Liberation of South Africa.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 25, no. 3 (1987): 505-540.
This article argues that Zambia’s disengagement from South Africa has been a hindrance on the region rather than a boost.
Hare Paul. Angola’s Last Best Chance for Peace: An Insider’s Account of the Peace Process. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998.
This book exists as Hare’s memoirs for his experience in the United Nations peacemaking process. I use it to show his regret at not paying close enough attention to UNITA’s interests.
Harvey, Robert. The Fall of Apartheid: The Inside Story from Smuts to Mbeki. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001.
This book is a general history of apartheid. One section examines the role of Angola on the apartheid movement.
James III, W. Martin. A Political History of the Civil War in Angola: 1974-1990 New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2011.
This book is an essential history of the UNITA movement and argues for its legitimacy as a party in Angolan politics (a small biography on Savimbi would have been nice in the book).
Leffler, Melvyn P. and David S. Painter. ed. Origins of the Cold War: An International History. New York: Routledge, 2005.
This book is a collection of essays on the Cold War displaying a working framework. It woefully neglects Angola and Africa in general.
le Billon, Philippe. “Angola’s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975- 2000.” African Affairs 100, no. 398 (2001): 55-80.
This article examines the relationship between oil and diamond revenue in Angola and the continuance of its civil war. It argues that both items pay mainly for military funds rather than social care (oil for MPLA and diamonds for UNITA).
Mata, Inocência, and Vicky Hartnack. “Under the Sign of a Projective Nostalgia: Agostinho Neto and Angolan Postcolonial Poetry.” Research in African Literatures 38, no. 1 (2007): 54- 67.
This article compares modern poetry with postcolonial poetry in Angola exploring the theme of utopia.
Miller, Jamie. “Yes, Minister: Reassessing South Africa’s Intervention in the Angolan Civil War, 1975–1976.” Journal of Cold War Studies 15, no. 3 (2013): 4-33.
This article examines the dimensions of South Africa’s foreign policy and its place in the Angola context.
Minter, William. Apartheid’s Contras. Trenton: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994.
This book examines South Africa’s role in Angola. Its main thesis argues that Savimbi wanted peace in a fair power-sharing agreement rather than simply dominating Angola himself.
Moorman, Marissa. “Of Westerns, Women, and War: Re-Situating Angolan Cinema and the Nation.” Research in African Literatures 32, no. 3 (2001): 103-122.
This article examines Angolan cinema and its role in revolutionary Angola. I used a section of it to show MPLA’s desire to gain Soviet support.
Pearce J. “Control, Politics and Identity in the Angolan Civil War.” African Affairs 111, no. 444 (2012): 442-465.
This article argues for the creation of political identity in Angola and its use as control over various sections of society. It helps show each parties striving for legitimacy in the eyes of the Angolan people.
Price, Robert M. “Southern African Regional Security: Pax or Pox Pretoria?” World Policy Journal 2, no. 3 (1985): 533-554.
This article examines South Africa hegemony and its effects on Black Africa.
Smith, Tony. “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War.” Diplomatic History 24, no. 4, (2000): 567-591.
This article provide a historiographical account of the frameworks used when studying the Cold War, and further supplements Cold War history with his own framework to re- orient the study of the Cold War from the perspective of the periphery. I use this article as the basis for my thesis that the conflict in Angola was not a proxy war of the Cold War when one re-orients the perceptive the periphery of the Angolan people.
Steele James D. “The Role of South Africa’s Aggression Upon Hunger and Famine in Southern Africa.” Black Scholar. 18, no. 6 (1987): 18-25.
This article examines South Africa’s strategy of destabilization and its effects (hunger and famine) on the region.
Warwick, Rodney. “Operation Savannah: A Measure of SADF Decline, Resourcefulness and Modernization.” Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 40, no. 3 (2013): 354-397.
This article examines South Africa’s first operation in Angola, and the military lessons gained from its involvement.
Venter, A. J. ed. War Stories: Up Close and Personal in Third World Conflicts. Pretoria: Protea Book House, 2011.
This book is a collection of personal war stories of covert operations throughout Africa. The sections about Angola are very interesting as they detail corruption in both armies.
1 Found in Quero Acordar a Alva. Inocência Mata and Vicky Hartnack, “Under the Sign of a Projective Nostalgia: Agostinho Neto and Angolan Postcolonial Poetry,” Research in African Literatures 38, no. 1 (2007): 57.
2 Tony Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 24, no. 4, (2000): 568.
3 William Minter, Apartheid’s Contras (New Jersey: Trenton, Witwatersrand University Press, 1994), 126
4 Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War,” 568.
5 W. Martin James III, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola: 1974-1990 (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2011), 64.
6 Interestingly enough, Chipenda and his close followers chose to join the South African army as the 32nd battalion rather than join with UNITA under Savimbi.
7 James, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola,
8 See Appendix A for a list of South African operations in Angola.
9 James, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 157.
10 Minter, Apartheid’s Contras, 126.
11 Based on several interviews Minter performed following the end of the conflict in 2002. Minter, Apartheid’s Contras, 81.
12 J. Pearce, “Control, Politics and Identity in the Angolan Civil War,” African Affairs. 111, no. 444 (2012): 443.
13 Ibid., 460.
14 Ibid., 462.
15 Philippe le Billon, “Angola’s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975-2000,” African Affairs. 100, no. 398 (2001): 60.
16 le Billon, “Angola’s Political Economy of War,” 79.
17 Pearce, “Control, Politics and Identity in the Angolan Civil War,” 463.
18 Paul Hare, Angola’s Last Best Chance for Peace : An Insider’s Account of the Peace Process (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press 1998), 27.
19 Ibid., 57.
20 Ibid., 61.
21 James, 458.
22 Piero Gleijeses, “Cuba and the Independence of Namibia,” Cold War History 7, no. 2 (2007): 289.
23 Rodney Warwick, “Operation Savannah: A Measure of SADF Decline, Resourcefulness and Modernization.” Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies. 40, no. 3 (2013): 356.
24 Minter, Apartheid’s Contras, 222.
25 See Appendix B, Table 2.
26 James, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 228.
27 Harvey, The Fall of Apartheid, 168.
28 Robert Price, “Southern African Regional Security: Pax or Pox Pretoria?” World Policy Journal 2, no. 3 (1985): 540.
29 Jamie Miller, “Yes, Minister: Reassessing South Africa’s Intervention in the Angolan Civil War, 1975–1976,” Journal of Cold War Studies. 15, no. 3 (2013): 3.
30 J. Leo Cefkin, “African Development Strategies and the White Ruled States of Southern Africa,” Africa Today. 20, no. 4 (1973): 33.
31Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 228.
32 Ibid.,37.
33 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 228.
34 Minter, Apartheid’s Contras, 258.
35 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 287.
36 Kenneth Good, “Zambia and the Liberation of South Africa,” The Journal of Modern African Studies. 25, no. 3 (1987): 528. See Appendix B Table 1 to see the drastic reduction in trade following MPLA’s control of the railway.
37 James, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 61.
38 Pearce, “Control, Politics and Identity in the Angolan Civil War,” 451.
39 Marissa Moorman, “Of Westerns, Women, and War: Re-Situating Angolan Cinema and the Nation,” Research in African Literatures. 32, no. 3 (2001): 110.
40 Moorman. “Of Westerns, Women, and War,” 111.
41 Miller, “Yes, Minister,” 20.
42 Minter, Apartheid’s Contras, 5.
43 Venter, A. J. ed. War Stories: Up Close and Personal in Third World Conflicts (Pretoria: Protea Book House 2011), 169.
44 James, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 37.
45 Pearce, “Control, Politics and Identity in the Angolan Civil War,” 451.
46 Minter, Apartheid’s Contras, 226.
47 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 254.
48 James, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 133.
49 Ibid., 133.
50 James, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 164.
51 James, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 16.
52 Ibid., 213.
53 James, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 285.
54 James, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 132.